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There is increasing evidence from scanner data that branded foods in the grocery retailing 
sector contain a substantial amount of price rigidity (HERRMANN/MÖSER 2003). One of the 
many alternative explanations for price rigidity is the existence of psychological pricing 
points. We define psychological pricing points as round numbers, which may be seen by 
decision-makers as price barriers: If those are exceeded, this may lead to a substantial 
reduction in consumption. Consequently, psychological pricing is defined here as just-below-
the-round-figure pricing
1). There is evidence that such prices, e.g. 0.49 DM or 4.99 €, have 
been used frequently (FENGLER/WINTER 2001; SCHINDLER/KIRBY 1996). The economic 
literature has been most hesitant against this theory and, in a survey, BLINDER et al. (1998) 
found no strong support based on the views of business managers. In that study, however, 
retail trade is underrepresented. The theory of psychological pricing points continues to be an 
important concept for pricing in firms which directly sell to consumers. Empirical findings in 
various studies, e.g. in the early work by FRIEDMAN (1967) for food retailing, suggest that 
psychological prices are widely used in the retailing sector. Hence, it is the objective of this 
paper to elaborate to which extent psychological pricing plays a role in grocery retailing and 
whether it contributes to price rigidity of branded foods in Germany. The empirical analysis 
will be based on scanner data of weekly prices for 20 branded foods in Germany in the period 
1996-99. 
The paper is organized as follows. The literature on the theory and evidence of psychological 
pricing will be surveyed in Section 2. Then, the scanner data base is sketched in Section 3 and 
an overview of price rigidity in food markets is given. In Section 4, an empirical analysis of 
the importance of psychological pricing for branded foods follows. It will then be discussed in 
Section 5 whether psychological pricing is a main cause of food price rigidity. Conclusions 
are drawn and major results are summarized in Section 6. 
  12  Theory and Evidence of Psychological Pricing Points in the Literature 
We have to distinguish the industrial organization (IO) literature from the marketing literature 
on psychological pricing points. The treatment of the issue differs between the two branches 
of the literature. The increasing number of IO studies on price rigidity is partly driven by the 
major interest macroeconomists have in the microeconomic foundation of macroeconomic 
behaviour. More specifically, sticky prices are crucial in Keynesian macroeconomics 
(CARLTON 1986). Many studies have dealt with the question whether prices in the economy 
are actually sticky and why. Here, psychological pricing points come into play as they can 
cause price rigidity. There is also a natural interest of IO authors in the role of psychological 
prices for price rigidity as psychological prices are an outcome of imperfect markets. The 
marketing literature differs from the IO literature. Psychological prices are discussed there as 
to whether they are an adequate tool to realize firms’ profit objectives. The question is 
addressed, too, which kind of psychological prices performs best in terms of the marketing 
objectives. 
2.1 The IO literature 
In the IO literature on price rigidity, the theory of psychological pricing points has received 
some attention in the important book by BLINDER et al. (1998). BLINDER et al. surveyed 
decision-makers in firms on how they set prices and which explanations of price stickiness are 
important for their decisions. Psychological pricing points has been one of twelve theories of 
price stickiness which was included: It is one of the few theories of nominal rigidity. 
According to the theory of psychological pricing points, nominal pricing points are 
psychologically so important to consumers that these react with a strong decrease in demand 
if prices go beyond the psychological pricing point. Firms following the theory of 
psychological prices would, thus, start from the presumption of a kinked demand curve – with 
several kinks at different pricing points – where demand is strongly elastic above the kinks. 
  2At each kink, it is then optimal to leave the price unchanged for at least some variation in 
marginal costs. Hence, psychological pricing points are a cause of price rigidity if firms are 
profit maximizers. 
BLINDER et al. (1998) came up with some very interesting empirical conclusions. In general, 
the theory of psychological pricing points is ranked eighth out of twelve theories – with a 
generally low score of agreement. However, the authors find a significantly stronger 
agreement for those firms selling directly to consumers. Psychological pricing points, as far as 
they are regarded as important, are also seen as a cause of price asymmetry. Pricing points are 
rather viewed as a wall against further price increases than as a general guideline where each 
price change implies a move from one psychological pricing point to the next. Moreover, 
BLINDER et al. detect that those who think that quality is judged by price and who assess 
demand as elastic, rate psychological pricing points high, too. 
There are some other studies commenting on the role of psychological pricing for price 
stickiness. KASHYAP (1995), in his often-cited study on warehouse catalogue prices, found 
that “being near a price point in the low inflation period reduced the probability of a price 
change” (p. 268). He found some limited evidence for psychological pricing points. KÖHLER 
(1996), in a business-survey study, reached conclusions similar to BLINDER et al. for 
Germany. The theory of psychological pricing points was not supported by most participants 
of the study. However, there is a substantial amount of uncertainty regarding customers’ 
reactions to price changes which may cause price stickiness. The uncertainty about 
psychological pricing points seems to be part of this general uncertainty (KÖHLER 1996, pp. 
172-174). In a further study with German data, FENGLER and WINTER (2001) strongly confirm 
the relevance of psychological pricing points for coffee retail prices. The authors explore 
information of the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK) consumer panel and show that 
86 % of more than 14,000 purchases in 1995 were subject to psychological focal pricing 
  3(FENGLER/WINTER 2001, p. 100). Furthermore, it is elaborated that individual psychological 
prices matter for the dynamics of the general price adjustment. 
2.2  The marketing literature 
The marketing literature on psychological prices has a different focus compared to the IO 
literature. A major discussion exists on whether “psychological pricing”, “odd pricing” or 
“just-below-the-round-figure pricing” is justified from a marketing perspective or whether 
this pricing strategy leads to a major loss compared with even prices
2). Of course, it is crucial 
for the answer to this question whether and how strongly consumers react to odd as opposed 
to even prices. It is also important whether firms have full information on the behaviour of 
their customers or not. 
In the German literature, KAAS and HAY (1984) showed that the firms’ decisions for odd 
rather than even prices may induce high aggregate losses, although, e.g., the difference 
between 2.99 and 3.00 DM seems negligible. Based on their finding and a survey of the 
related literature on psychological pricing, GEDENK/SATTLER (1999) argued that the firms’ 
decisions may be justified under uncertainty. They agree that high losses may occur if existing 
price thresholds are ignored. Additionally, they derive that the error is many hundred times 
more severe, if existing price thresholds are ignored than if non-existing price thresholds are 
considered with a general pricing strategy ending at digit 9. Thus, firms suffering from 
uncertainty about their customers’ behaviour are better advised if they follow an odd-pricing 
strategy. 
Some recent contributions in the marketing literature are based on explanations of price 
endings based on cognitive psychology. Some major hypotheses are empirically tested and the 
sales effect of odd prices measured (STIVING/WINER 1997; SCHINDLER/KIBARIAN 1996; 
SCHINDLER/KIRBY 1997). A common result is that prices ending at digit 9 may raise sales. 
STIVING/WINER (1997) distinguish level and image effects for specific price endings. One 
  4level effect, also stressed by SCHINDLER/KIBARIAN (1996) and SCHINDLER/KIRBY (1997), is 
due to rounding down. Consumers are expected to round down prices and, thus, an incentive 
exists for firms to utilize just-below prices ending at digits 9 or 99. Another explanation for a 
level effect is left-to-right comparison. This implies that consumers tend to compare prices by 
considering the digits from left to right. Image effects mean that consumers attach a low- or 
high-price image or a low- or high-quality image to certain price endings, e.g. digit 9. Based 
on empirical results for tuna and yoghurt, STIVING and WINTER find that level and image 
effects do exist and market shares are affected by price endings. SCHINDLER and KIBARIAN 
show with an experiment that prices ending in the digits 99 rather than 00 increase consumer 
purchasing at a direct-mail women’s clothing retailer. SCHINDLER and KIRBY use a sample of 
retail price advertisements and find that 9-ending prices are overrepresented. They argue that 
the tendency of consumers to underestimate prices is responsible for this pattern and for a 
positive sales effect. ANDERSON/SIMESTER (2003) confirm in field experiments for sales of 
US retailers that the use of $ 9 endings has a direct demand-increasing effect on dresses, in 
particular for new items in retailers’ catalogues. 
We can summarize that the IO as well as the marketing literature contain various theoretical 
arguments for the relevance of psychological pricing points to consumers. Despite this, 
economists often treat the rationale for psychological pricing points with caution. Given this 
background, the following empirical analysis is supposed to clarify whether psychological 
pricing is widespread in German grocery retailing and whether it actually contributes to price 
rigidity. If psychological pricing is important, the evidence will also be interpreted in the 
context of the IO and the marketing literature. 
  53  Data and Empirical Evidence on Price Rigidity 
In this section, the scanner dataset is described and empirical findings on price rigidity for the 
20 selected food brands are summarized. The evidence on price rigidity is based on these 
scanner data as is the evidence on psychological pricing in Section 4. 
3.1  The Scanner Data 
The quantitative analysis is based on a commercially available scanner data set provided by 
MADAKOM GmbH (MADAKOM 1999a). It captures scanner data from the German food-
retailing sector for 144 weeks, i.e. the period from September 30, 1996, to June 28, 1999. 
Four types of retailing firms were selected for this study: (i) large consumer markets (1,500 to 
5,000 m
2 sales area); (ii) small consumer markets (800 to 1,499 m
2 area); (iii) supermarkets 
(400 to 799 m
2) and (iv) discounters. A further selection criterion was that data were available 
for 100 consecutive weeks. 38 stores remained in the sample after applying this criterion as 
well as the rule that the regional distribution of stores should approximately picture the 
structure of the German food-retailing sector. Data for several retailing companies were 
included. 
The selection of brands covers breakfast products in the broadest sense. The national food 
brands included are summarized in Appendix 1. 
The individual articles could be identified with their EAN codes. EAN codes contain 13 or 8 
numbers which are printed on the product and they contain an identification of the 
manufacturer and the details of the product. Comprehensive information was available on the 
items. This information includes the quantity sold, the product price, the name of the product 
and the package size. Information on different promotion activities at the point of sale were 
available as well as a variable accounting for price discounts. Those price actions are 
measured as those prices which remain for four weeks or less by at least five percent below 
  6the normal price. After more than four weeks, such low prices are counted as normal price 
(MADAKOM 1999b). 
It has to be stressed that this is a unique dataset at the individual retailers’ level. Substantial 
work in recent years is based on consumer panel data (e.g., FENGLER/WINTER 2001; 
LOY/WEISS 2003) which might include the customers’ switching from store to store and, thus, 
a different type of price rigidity
3). The utilized scanner dataset covers the retailers’ pricing 
decisions irrespective of potential consumer switching between stores. However, as is in most 
comparable studies, the data do not include sociodemographic variables of consumers as these 
are typically not available in either retailer or consumer panels. 
3.2  Empirical Evidence on Price Rigidity 
Table 1 summarizes price rigidity of the selected food brands. Price rigidity (PRIG) is 
measured as the mean duration of unchanged prices, following POWERS and POWERS (2001): 
(1)  PRIG =    PCH w w/.
w stands for the number of weekly price observations, wPCH is the number of weeks with price 
changes. 
The following results can be summarized: 
1.  There is a substantial degree of price rigidity at the retail level which differs strongly 
across brands. There are brands where the mean duration of unchanged prices is as 
high as 53 weeks. If we compute the median of the medians for the 20 food brands, it 
is 18.9 weeks. Apparently, the median price rigidity indicates that prices of branded 
foods remain unchanged for 19 weeks. 
2.  Price rigidity varies strongly across grocery-retailing firms. It can be shown that the 
same holds true for the importance of price actions (see, HERRMANN/MOESER/WEBER 
2004). Differences are so strong that no uniform pricing pattern for all retail chains 
  7can be discovered. This is an indication of market power and the potential to set prices 
independently of the competitors’ behaviour. On a competitive market, similar pricing 
patterns would not occur under ceteris-paribus conditions as input costs would affect 
all retailers similarly. 
3.  If price actions are additionally considered, it is striking that price rigidity is lower for 
those brands and in those firms which are characterized by a larger number of price 
actions. The correlation coefficient between price rigidity and price actions is negative 
and significantly different from zero (cf. Table 4). 
  8Table 1:  Evidence on Price Rigidity in German Food Stores, 20 Brands, Weekly Prices, 
1996-99
a)




A  B  C  D  E  F 
Median 
1  200.5  72.4  175.0  -
d) 134.0  69.3  134.0 
2  35.9  11.2  8.5  23.2  139.0  11.9  17.6 
3  35.8  8.7  3.8  19.6  94.5  9.5  14.6 
4  16.3  2.7  7.2  11.1  18.0  9.3  10.2 
5  24.1  6.3  6.7  18.3  9.9  12.7  11.3 
6  14.1  14.9  6.5  104.0  9.4  5.0  11.8 
7  73.7  93.3  11.3  -
c) 24.1  15.2  24.1 
8  50.8  9.6  7.1  16.8  48.9  10.4  13.6 
9  36.6  17.9  17.7  33.6  34.0  7.4  25.8 
10  23.3  5.1  7.1  37.8  16.9  27.7  20.1 
11  -
d) 21.2  6.9  63.4  -
d) -
c) 21.2 
12  22.0  8.9  21.6  69.0  81.5  22.2  22.1 
13  16.7  6.7  7.3  14.5  10.5  15.1  12.5 
14  39.5  5.2  6.8  59.3  60.3  10.2  24.9 
15  42.6  5.6  7.1  127.4  49.0  11.6  27.1 
16  17.9  3.9  19.5  16.3  69.6  13.6  17.1 
17  10.2  3.3  7.4  10.9  39.8  7.2  8.8 
18  19.9  4.5  4.2  18.7  139.3  8.2  13.5 
19  46.3  26.7  39.3  29.3  31.1  56.1  35.2 
20  123.3  23.1  10.2  82.6  -
c) 17.8  23.1 
Median  35.8  8.8  7.3  26.3  44.3  11.9  19.1
e)/18.9
f)
a) The sample period and the included stores are explained in the text. The number of observations differs across 
the grocery-retailing firms and products. - b) Price rigidity is measured as in equation (1) in the text. – c) Not 
computed as no price changes were observed. – d) Not distributed in this grocery retailing firm. – e) Median of 
the medians, computed across firms. – f) Median of the medians, computed across brands. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
4 Empirical Analysis of Psychological Pricing in German Grocery 
Retailing 
We investigate in this section how important psychological pricing actually is in grocery 
retailing and whether the statistical evidence is consistent with the presented hypotheses from 
cognitive psychology on the level and image effects of price endings. Like in the analysis of 
price rigidity, psychological pricing is analyzed for the selected 20 food brands in six different 
  9German grocery-retailing firms. As mentioned earlier, we define psychological prices as those 
prices which are slightly below psychological pricing points, e.g. 0.49 DM, 0.99 DM or 4.99 
DM. 
The most important psychological prices of all 20 brands have been analyzed in detail for all 
six grocery-retailing firms. We define those psychological prices as important ones which 
include 5% or more of all observed prices in the respective firms. Two brands are covered in 
Appendices 2 and 3 as examples; they provide an impression of the importance of 
psychological prices in individual firms’ pricing decisions for two very different brands.  
Brands 4 and 20 are selected in Appendices 2 and 3. Brand 4, the ground coffee, is very often 
utilized for price actions. Therefore, this is the brand where the two most important 
psychological prices reach the lowest share of all observed prices among the 20 brands. For 
brand 20, the crispbread with chocolate, on the other hand, the share of the two most 
important prices is the highest among all brands.  
A common result for the two examples and, actually, for all 20 brands is that psychological 
pricing is most significant in German grocery retailing. A high share of all observed prices are 
psychological prices for the two examples in Appendices 2 and 3 and the other 18 brands, too. 
A further common result is that a relatively small number of psychological prices, e.g. five, 
accounts for a major share of all observed prices. This suggests that psychological pricing 
points along the lines of Sweezy’s kinked demand function may well be relevant for retailers’ 
pricing decisions. Stronger differences across brands occur, however, when the share of very 
few psychological prices – e.g. two or three – in all prices are measured. The differences 
between the two selected brands in Appendices 2 and 3 are cases in point. When 
psychological prices are important for a brand but the concentration on very few 
psychological prices does not exist, this indicates that no strong price barriers are involved. 
  10Rather, pricing seems to be consistent with the arguments forwarded by cognitive psychology, 
e.g. rounding down or left-to-right comparisons. 
In Tables 2 and 3, concentration ratios are presented for the five (two) most important 
psychological prices for all 20 products in the six firms. The CR5 (CR2) values indicate the 
relative importance of these five (two) prices in pricing decisions across all brands. 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 confirm that psychological prices for branded foods in Germany 
are extremely important. For eight out of 20 branded foods, Table 2 reveals that five or less of 
the important psychological prices covered more than 90 % of all observed prices in all six 
grocery-retailing firms. In additional eight cases, such a situation is given in five of the six 
grocery-retailing firms. And in all other cases, there are more than half of the grocery-
retailing firms where five important psychological prices cover more than 90  % of all 
observed prices. 
In all cases, the relative significance of the five most important psychological prices, i.e. CR5, 
is very high. In no case it is less than 70 %. The lowest share was 71.1 % (brand 4, firm B). In 
almost all cases it was higher than 80 % (114 of 117) and most often higher than 90 % (95 of 
117 cases). 
We know from U.S. studies that other price endings than digit 9 have some importance, 
especially digits 0 and 5 (SCHINDLER/KIRBY 1997). The detailed analysis at the brand level 
indicates that it is clearly the digit 9 which dominates as price ending for the selected German 
food brands. Appendix 4 presents only a few prices with other endings than digit 9 that 
reached 5 % or more of all observed prices in individual retailing firms. Only digits 5, 7 and 8 
are somewhat important, but they must be regarded as exceptions rather than the rule. Firm-
specific patterns are evident here, too. The price endings at digit 7 occurred – with one 
exception – only in the grocery-retailing firm F. In three cases, prices ended at digit 8 in firm 
C gained some importance. In individual cases prices ending at digit 5 were important for four 
  11different firms, but never for B and F. In two of these cases, a significant share of all observed 
prices were reached (28.4 % for the price 1.65 DM of brand 11 and 23.1 % for the price 2.85 
DM of brand 18, both at firm D). 
Table 2:  Concentration Ratios of the Five Most Important Psychological Prices for 20 
Brands in Six German Grocery-Retailing Firms (CR5), 1996-99 
Grocery-Retailing Firms 
Brands 
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d) 85.6  86.1 
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b) 90.9  95.8  96.1
d) 100








Median  98.5  94.6  90.9  96.0  99.2  90.9  95.7
f)/95.3
g)
a), b), c), d) Concentration ratios of the single, two, three, four most important psychological price(s). – e) Not 
distributed. – f) Median of the medians, computed across firms. – g) Median of the medians, computed across 
brands. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
The descriptive statistics on the role of psychological prices suggest as a general result that 
level and image effects posited by cognitive psychology do exist. With regard to the level 
effects, the dominant influence of prices ending at digit 9 indicate that rounding down prices 
and left-to-right comparisons are consistent with the data. 
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there are substantial differences in the psychological-pricing strategies across brands and 
firms. Table 3 summarizes to which extent pricing is concentrated on the two most important 
psychological prices, respectively. 
Table 3:  Concentration Ratios of the Two Most Important Psychological Prices for 20 
Brands in Six German Grocery-Retailing Firms (CR2), 1996-99 
Grocery-Retailing Firms 
Brands 
A  B  C  D  E  F 
Median 
1  99.8  86.7  96.8  n.d.
b) 100  91.3  96.8 
2  92.3  63.5  69.2  77.8  100  62.7  73.5 
3  92.9  95.0  89.8  83.1  100  58.1  91.4 
4  67.0  42.9  50.1  58.2  51.6  57.8  54.7 
5  83.6  55.3  72.2  55.1  71.1  40.5  63.2 
6  76.3  66.0  83.1
a) 99.0  93.5  58.9  79.7 
7  83.5  99.4  92.3  100  97.1
a) 59.6  87.9 
8  99.5  66.1  65.3  65.9  91.1  68.3  67.2 
9  84.1  65.4  75.7  50.7  82.4  47.3  70.6 
10  98.3  65.3  77.9  81.9  97.0  50.7  79.9 
11  n.d.
b) 96.6
a) 91.1  99.2  n.d.
b) 100  97.9 
12  87.7  55.6  88.7  99.3  99.4
a) 56.9  88.2 
13  73.5  46.6  69.6  82.7  95.0  36.2  71.6 
14  98.8  83.0  81.6  85.3  99.1
a) 87.8  86.6 
15  98.7  81.7  83.5  95.7  98.9
a) 88.8  92.3 
16  83.6  56.9  75.2  72.4  98.3  72.7  74.0 
17  91.1  60.6  87.5
a) 83.4  99.1  58.4  85.5 
18  71.9  66.4  63.7  74.1  100  84.1  73.0 
19  99.8  66.3  68.4  83.3  74.7  64.8  71.6 
20  99.6  84.5  88.3  99.7  100
a) 97.4  98.5 
Median  91.1  66.1  79.8  83.1  98.3  61.2  81.5
c)/79.8
d)
a) Concentration ratio of the single most important psychological price. – b) Not distributed. – c) Median of the 
medians, computed across firms. – d) Median of the medians, computed across brands. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
When we consider the median CR2 across brands for the individual grocery-retailing firms, 
the two most important psychological prices capture at least 61.2 % (firm F), but in four of 
the six firms 80 % or more. The highest median values are those for firms E (98.3 %) and A 
(91.1 %). These two firms do stick most to only a few psychological prices for a wide sample 
  13of food brands. Interestingly, the grocery-retailing firms A and E are also characterized by the 
lowest number of price actions and the highest price rigidity. 
The median CR2 for the individual brands across the six firms differs strongly, too. However, 
it never falls below 50 %. The lowest median of CR2 is 54.7 % (brand 4), followed by 63.2 % 
(brand 5) and 67.2 % (brand 8). Two of these three products with the lowest CR2 are also 
among those three with the lowest price rigidity (brands 4 and 5). The median CR2 is much 
higher for other products and is in three cases above 95 %: 98.5 % (brand 20), 97.9 % (brand 
11) and 96.8 % (brand 1). One of these, brand 1, also ranks highest among all 20 brands in 
terms of price rigidity. 
These individual cases suggest already that the concentration on a few psychological prices in 
food retailing, as measured by CR2, might be associated positively with price rigidity (PRIG) 
and negatively with price instability (INST) and the number of price actions (ACTIONS). It is 
a further interesting question whether psychological pricing is more concentrated on just a 
few prices when the unit price of a brand (PRICE) is higher. 
These hypotheses are tested first within a correlation analysis. All variables are measured on 
the basis of the scanner dataset, and only the 18 brands which are distributed in all firms are 
included. PRIG and CR2 are available from Tables 1 and 3 respectively. Data for the number 
of price actions (ACTIONS), on the average prices of the brands (PRICE) and on price 
instability (INST) are available from the authors upon request. The computation of price 
instability is based on the trend-corrected coefficient of variation as suggested by CUDDY and 
DELLA VALLE (1978). 
Table 4 presents the correlation results for the pooled dataset of 18 brands and six firms
4). The 
major results of Table 4 are as follows: 
1.  There is some correlation between psychological-pricing strategies and the other 
variables. The concentration on a few psychological prices in food retailing is 
  14significantly stronger where price instability and the number of price actions are lower 
and where price rigidity is higher. It also seems that brands with a high per-unit price 
are associated with a lower CR2, but the correlation coefficient does not reach the 
95 %-level of statistical significance. 
2.  Apart from psychological prices, the number of price actions is positively correlated 
with price instability and negatively with price rigidity.  
The general pattern shown in Table 4 is not only valid in the comprehensive dataset for all 
firms, but holds true for the individual firms in most cases
5). 
Table 4:  Correlation Coefficients Between the Concentration of Psychological Prices 
(CR2) and Other Variables, German Food Brands, All Firms
a)
Variables  INST ACTIONS  PRICE  PRIG  CR2 
INST  1.000        
ACTIONS  0.427
*** 1.000      
PRICE  0.222
* 0.174 1.000     
PRIG  -0.492
*** -0.459







* Statistically significant at the 99.9 %-, 99 %-, 95 %-level. 
a) The variables are defined in the text. Data for PRIG and CR2 are from Tables 1 and 2. Only those 18 brands 
are included which are distributed in all firms (n = 108).  
Source: Authors’ computations. 
5  Psychological Pricing as One Determinant of Price Rigidity in German 
Grocery Retailing 
Table 4 has shown that psychological-pricing strategies are correlated with price rigidity and 
with the number of price actions. Correlation, however, is not causality. From an industrial-
organization perspective, the question arises whether the kind of psychological pricing leads 
to additional price rigidity. This question will be analyzed in the following. It has been 
elaborated in the literature that price promotions are a major component of retailers’ pricing 
strategies (HOSKEN/REIFFEN 2001) and a major determinant of food price variability 
  15(HERRMANN/MOESER 2003). Moreover, differential firm strategies have also been identified 
in retailers’ price policies. In particular, an “everyday low price” (EDLP) strategy is adopted 
by some retailers and Hi-Lo pricing with a promotion-oriented strategy by others 
(HOCH/DRÈZE/PURK 1994). Firm strategies as well as the number of price promotions should 
affect price rigidity. 
We model price rigidity across brands and firms within a regression analysis where we 
consider  ACTIONS and firm-specific variables as main determinants of price rigidity. 
Additionally, the psychological-pricing strategy is included as explanatory variable by CR2. 
Several alternative model specifications are presented in Appendix 5. Price rigidity is the 
endogenous variable in all these models, as we know that retail sales are an important 
strategic variable for intertemporal price discrimination by firms. Arguments have been 
provided above why psychological prices may be used as strategic variable, too. By 
definition, price rigidity will be affected by the extent to which these strategic variables are 
utilized. Thus, we can expect that PRIG is affected by ACTIONS and CR2 and not vice 
versa
6). 
The major result of the empirical analysis is that – apart from price promotions and firm-
specific characteristics as introduced by dummy variables – psychological pricing contributes 
significantly to the explanation of price rigidity. The coefficient for the impact of CR2 on 
PRIG is positive in all model specifications. The change of the regression coefficients in 
Model 3 compared with Models 1 and 2 indicates the existence of some multicollinearity. 
However, both coefficients – for ACTIONS and CR2 – are statistically significant in Model 3. 
The regression coefficients remain rather stable, too, when additional variables are included 
as in Models 4 and 5. Models 4 and 5 illustrate that the level of the unit price and intercept 
dummies for firms do not affect price rigidity when the number of sales and the 
psychological-pricing pattern are already taken into account. However, the introduction of 
  16slope dummies shows that there are firm-specific effects of price actions on price rigidity for 
firms A, B and E which are at least significant at the 90 %-level. 
If differential effects of sales on price rigidity are introduced in the regression model, the 
preferred specification is: 
(2) 
(3.31)
2 CR * * 0.7226
(-1.84) (2.67)
ACTIONS E DUMMY ACTIONS B DUMMY
ACTIONS A DUMMY ACTIONS EPRIG
⋅ +
⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ +
− − −
⋅ − ⋅ − − =
[*]
[*]
3096 . 1 * * 3236 . 0
) 66 . 1 ( ) 85 . 3 ( ) 29 . 0 (





2 R  = 0.36; F = 13.01
***, n = 108) 
EPRIG is the estimated value of price rigidity (PRIG); DUMMY A (DUMMY B, DUMMY E) 
are dummy variables for the grocery-retailing firms A (B, E) with 1 for the respective firm and 




[*] indicate the 99.9  %-,   
99 %-, 95 %-, 90 %-levels of statistical significance. 
Equation (2) indicates that 
(i)  the marginal impact of one additional retail sale on price rigidity in the reference group, 
i.e. firms C, D and F, is a negative one with a decrease of 0.54 in the number of weeks 
with unchanged prices; 
(ii)  this negative marginal impact of an additional retail sale is even stronger in firms A and 
E, by 0.73 and 1.31 weeks respectively, but weaker in firm B, by 0.32 weeks; 
(iii) an increase  in CR2, i.e. the share of the two most important psychological prices in 
price-setting, by one percentage point raises the number of weeks with unchanged prices 
by 0.72. 
  17We can conclude from the analysis of the pooled data set that, as expected, the number of 
price promotions is a significant determinant of the rigidity of food prices. An increasing 
number of promotions reduces price rigidity the most in retailing firms with a relatively low 
number of price actions (firms A and E). On the other hand, the effect is weakest in the firm 
with the highest number of price actions (firm B). Moreover, psychological pricing of retailers 
does affect food price rigidity, too. 
When the importance of price actions and psychological pricing for price rigidity is tested for 
the individual grocery-retailing firms in separate regressions, some similarities and some 
differences compared with the pooled results are visible. Again, the influence of price actions 
on price rigidity is a negative one in all equations of Appendix 6. The coefficients are 
statistically different from zero in four of six firms. The psychological-pricing variable is only 
for firm D significantly positive as expected. This suggests that firms’ individual strategies 
with regard to psychological pricing matter and might lead to a significant coefficient of CR2 
in equation (2) and, more generally, in the analysis of the pooled data set. Apparently, it is the 
differential use of psychological prices across firms which contribute to the explanation of the 
variation in price rigidity. 
6  Summary and Conclusions 
It was the objective of this paper to elaborate in how far psychological pricing plays a role in 
grocery retailing and whether it contributes to price rigidity of branded foods in Germany. For 
this purpose, a large scanner dataset is exploited. 
In the explanation of price stickiness, economists and many business managers do not rank 
the marketing argument of psychological pricing points very highly. Despite this, the analysis 
shows that psychological pricing points are extremely important in German food retailing. 
When prices of 20 food brands are investigated at the point of sale across 38 stores for 144 
  18weeks in the period 1996-99, it is striking that prices ending at digit 9 are by far most 
important. Moreover, there is often a strong concentration in pricing on only a few 
psychological prices. This concentration is clearly higher for firms with an EDLP compared 
to a Hi-Lo strategy and it differs across brands. The CR5 of the five most important 
psychological prices is in all cases remarkable: It never falls below 70 % of all prices and 
ranges above 90 % in roughly four out of five cases. 
Moreover, psychological pricing seems to be one major determinant of price rigidity in 
German grocery retailing. Prices of branded foods are surprisingly sticky given the high 
variability of agricultural commodity prices in food retailing. Apparently, prices do not 
change much – apart from sales – and if they do, they tend to move from one psychological 
price to the next. Regression results show that price rigidity is higher for products where 
concentration on a few psychological prices is more important. It is lower for products with a 
high number of price discounts. Additionally, price rigidity as well as the CR2 for the most 
important psychological prices differs widely across firms – i.e., grocery retailers do not 
follow one uniform pricing strategy. 
There are interesting questions remaining for future research. It is not transparent why exactly 
psychological pricing points are viewed as important by grocery retailers. Survey results, 
similar to those by BLINDER et al. but within the retailing sector, could solve this puzzle. 
Furthermore, it is most likely that there are other determinants of price rigidity in grocery 
retailing than the importance of sales, psychological prices, and firm-specific effects. It 
remains a challenge to collect additional data, e.g. on the competitive situation or on menu 
costs, in order to test for other theories of price rigidity, too. 
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1)  Of course, this is a restricted view of psychological pricing. Price-setting by decision-
makers may be related, e.g., to consumers’ perception of product quality. It may be the 
objective to send out quality signals via prices in order to affect the consumers’ 
behaviour independent of the objective quality of the product. Such behaviour would 
have to be included in a wider definition of psychological pricing. 
2)  See, e.g., BLATTBERG/NESLIN (1990, pp. 349 et seq.) for a survey of the importance of 
psychological pricing in retailers’ promotional activities. 
3)  Several U.S. studies are based on the so-called BLS data of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, e.g., BILS/KLENOW (2002). These data are the basis for the consumer price 
index and include prices on 70,000 to 80,000 non-housing goods and services per month, 
collected from around 22,000 outlets across 88 geographic areas. An information on “no 
price change” is also available that can be used as one indicator of price rigidity. 
4)  Here and in the following analysis in Section 5, the following assumption has been 
made.  PRIG is set to 200 by assumption in those two cases where brands were 
distributed in all six firms but no price changes did occur in one of these firms: brand 
7/firm D; brand 20/firm E. It would have been a distortion to leave the two cases with 
the highest price rigidity out. It would have been a distortion, too, to insert the value 
infinity which the equation (1) for PRIG yields in these two cases, if an infinitisemal 
value rather than zero is introduced for the number of price changes. 
5)  When we start from a statistical significance level of 95% or more, CR2 is positively 
correlated with PRIG in firms A, B, and D. CR2 is negatively correlated with INST and 
ACTIONS in firms A, B, D, and E. A high unit price is strongly negatively correlated 
with a low CR2 and vice versa in firms A and E, i.e. in two firms with very different 
levels of price rigidity. In all six firms, ACTIONS is positively correlated with price 
instability and negatively with price rigidity. 
6)  There is some additional evidence in HERRMANN/MOESER/WEBER (2004) which deals 
with price rigidity within an equation system. The results support the view of PRIG 
being the endogenous and not an exogenous variable. 
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  23Appendix 1:  Foods Brands Included in the Statistical Analysis 
 
Brand Description  Brand  Name 
1  170g-bottle of coffee cream with 12% fat  Baerenmarke "Feine 12", 170g 
2  170g-bottle of evaporated milk with 8% fat  Baerenmarke Kaffeetraum 8%, 170g 
3  Nine-piece-package of frozen rolls  Coppenrath & Wiese "Unsere Goldstuecke", 9 
Stueck 
4  500g-package of ground coffee  Dallmayr Prodomo, 500g 
5  Package of four bottles at 100g of a probiotic drink  Danone Actimel Drink Classic, 4x100g 
6  500g-package of butter toast  Golden Toast Butter Toast, 500g 
7  Eight-piece-package of warm up rolls  Golden Toast Sonntagsbroetchen, 8 Stueck 
8  200g-tin of cappuccino with 10g milk chocolate  Jacob's Café Zauber Cappuccino, 200g plus 10g 
Milchschokolade 
9 375g-package  of  cornflakes  Kellogg's Cornflakes, 375 g 
10  250g-piece of Irish butter Kerrygold  Original Irische Butter, 250g 
11  1l-bottle of fresh milk with 3.8% fat  Landliebe Landmilch 3.8%, 1l 
12  500g-package of full corn bread  Lieken Urkorn "Das Vollkorn-Saftige", 500g 
13  500ml-beaker of chocolate drink  Muellermilch Schoko, 500ml 
14  375g-package of breakfast cereals  Nestlé Cini Minis, 375g 
15  375g-package of muesli-like breakfast cereals  Nestlé Nesquik fuer ein Knusperfruehstueck, 
375g 
16  400g-glass of nut-and-chocolate cream  Nutella, 400g 
17  500g-beaker of margarine  Rama, 500g 
18  450g-glass of strawberry jam  Schwartau Extra Erdbeerkonfituere Extra, 450g 
19  Package of 25 tea bags  Teekanne Teefix, 43.75g, 25 Teebeutel 
20  150g-package of crispbread with chocolate  Wasa Schoko Wikinger, 150g 
Source: Own compilation. 
  24Appendix 2:  The Distribution of Psychological Prices for the Ground Coffee Brand in 
the German Scanner Data (Brand 4: Dallmayr Prodomo, 500g)
a)
Percentage Shares of Psychological Prices in 
Various Grocery-retailing Firms  Most Important 
Psychological Prices 
(DM)  A 
(n = 525) 
B 
(n = 1264) 
C 
(n = 707) 
D 
(n = 1115) 
E 
(n = 561) 
F 
(n = 974) 
7.99   11.4         
8.49           6.3 
8.79       6.9     
8.97           7.2 
8.99   24.4  26.6  14.9  20.7  15.5 
9.49 21.1  6.3  10.9  6.5  21.4   
9.98   6.8  10.5       
9.99 39.0  18.5  23.5  35.5    42.3 
10.49   10.0  11.6  22.7  25.8  14.3 
10.79 28.0        25.8   
10.99 6.5           
Sum of the 
Psychological Prices 
(%) 
94.6  77.4  83.1  86.5  93.7  85.6 
Number of Different 
Prices  17  104  30  37  13  24 
a) All prices are included which account for 5% or more of all prices in the six grocery-retailing firms.  
Source: Authors’ computations with MADAKOM data. 
Appendix 3:  The Distribution of Psychological Prices for the Crispbread with 
Chocolate in the German Scanner Data (Brand 20: Wasa Schoko 
Wikinger, 150g)
a)
Percentage Shares of Psychological Prices in 
Various Grocery-retailing Firms  Most Important 
Psychological Prices 
(DM)  A 
(n = 497) 
B 
(n = 1141) 
C 
(n = 598) 
D 
(n = 586) 
E 
(n = 455) 
F 
(n = 664) 
2.69   12.4         
2.79 83.1  53.0    54.3  100  67.0 
2.85     13.4       
2.98     5.5       
2.99 16.5  31.5  74.9  45.4    30.4 
Sum of the 
Psychological Prices 
(%) 
99.6  96.9  93.8  99.7  100  97.4 
Number of Different 
Prices  4  14  9  4  1  4 
a) See footnote
 a), Appendix 2. 
Source: See Appendix 2. 




(DM)  Brand Firm 
Share of All Observed Prices 
for the Brand in the Respective 
Firm (%) 
1.15  13  E  16.4 
1.65 11  D  28.4 
2.25  17  A  8.1 
2.85 20  C  13.4 
2.85  18  D  23.1 
0.97 13  D  12.8 
1.37  13  F  9.3 
1.87 17  F  15.4 
1.97  17  F  15.8 
2.47 3  F  8.5 
3.47  9  F  6.9 
3.77 19  F  6.5 
3.77  9  F  18.9 
8.97 4  F  7.2 
1.98  17  E  18.5 
2.88 18  C  6.8 
2.98  20  C  5.5 
9.98 4  B and C 6.8  and  10.5 
a) All prices are included that do not end at digit 9 and have a share of all observed prices for the brand in the 
respective firm of 5% or more. 
Source: Authors’ Computations. 





Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
46.4257
*** -61.0614
*** -29.3988  -33.0158  -26.0260 












CR2    (6.36)  (4.00)  (4.02)  (3.56) 
     0.8200  
PRICE       (0.54)   
        -7.2165 
DUMMY A          (-0.79) 
       -6.6416 
DUMMY B         (0.67) 
        12.2927 
DUMMY E          (1.30) 










[*] Statistically significant at the 99.9 %-, 99 %-, 95 %-, 90 %-level. 
a) The variables are defined in the text. For the data sources, see the text, too. Only those 18 products are 
included which are distributed in all firms (n = 18). Values in parentheses are t values. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
  27Appendix 6:  Marginal Changes in Price Rigidity Due to a Change in the Number of 
Price Actions and a Change in Psychological Pricing
a)
Marginal Changes in PRIG Due to a Change in …  Grocery-retailing 
Firms  ACTIONS CR2  2 R   F 
-0.7275  0.8097 
A  (-1.28)  (1.27)  0.22  3.40
[*]
-0.0872 0.5312 






















[*] Statistically significant at the 99.9 %-, 99 %-, 95 %-, 90 %-level. 
a) The variables are defined in the text. For the data sources, see the text, too. Only those 18 products are 
included which are distributed in all firms (n = 18). Values in parentheses are t values. The regression 
equations for which the corrected coefficient of determination and F-values are presented contain a constant 
additionally. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
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